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Abstract 
Among the available selection strategies (e.g., top down selection), sliding bands with 
minority preference selection was shown to be the most effective at striking a balance 
between reducing adverse impact with minimal test utility loss. Unfortunately, all 
previous research into selection strategy effectiveness failed to model job acceptance 
rates, a variable shown to decrease overall test utility (Murphy, 1986). In this study we 
compared the utility and adverse impact ratios obtained from strict top down and sliding 
bands with minority preference selection strategies in which we varied selection ratios, 
job acceptance rates, and sample sizes. Across all conditions, utility and adverse impact 
ratios were found to be lower than was demonstrated in previous research which ignored 
job acceptance rates. Only one of our four hypotheses was supported in this study. We 
found that differences in adverse impact ratios between top down selection and banding 
with race preferential selection was reduced when high scoring minority applicants 
refused offers at a rate higher than high scoring majority applicants. Thus, the benefits 
that employers expect to see when utilizing the sliding band with minority preference 
selection strategy are not as great as previously believed. 
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Introduction and Review of the Literature 
There is a well known dilemma that occurs when employers seek to select the best 
candidates for job openings and create a diverse workforce. This dilemma occurs because 
minority groups often score lower that majority groups on many of the more popular 
selection tests. Thus, selecting top scoring candidates often leads to adverse impact; 
whereas, deliberately selecting more members from the lower scoring group will lead to 
lower test utility (Campion et al., 2001; Cascio, Outtz, Zedeck, & Goldstein, 1991; 
Sackett & Roth, 1991; Sackett & Wilk, 1994). Banding is a strategy that is used as a 
solution to this dilemma. 
Since selection tests are not perfect measures and thereby represent a certain 
amount of unreliability, small differences between scores on a selection test do not 
necessarily mean that the higher scoring individual will outperform the lower scoring 
individual on the job. Based on this notion, banding treats individual scores that fall 
within a specified range as identical. Employers can then deliberately select minority 
candidates from the score within the band in order to create a diverse workforce and 
maintain high economic utility of the selection tests (Cascio et al.. 199]; Murphy & 
Myors, 1995; Sackett & Roth, 1991). 
The purpose of this study is to challenge the results of studies (e.g., Cascio et al., 
1991; Sackett & Roth, 1991) that have concluded that banding is the preferred solution to 
the dilemma that employers face. In this study we will examine the effects that the use of 
banding strategies have on utility and adverse impact when job acceptance rates are less 
than 100%. The results will increase the knowledge about the effectiveness of using such 
a strategy for achieving a diverse workforce and maintaining high economic utility. 
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The Dilemma that Faces Employers 
Employers have the option to utilize several methods when selecting the best 
candidates for job openings. Candidates are often selected by their scores on a test or a 
series of selection procedures (e.g., tests of cognitive or physical ability, personality 
inventories, weighted application blanks, and situational tests) designed to predict job 
performance (Cascio et al., 1991; Siskin, 1995). A cutoff score is usually implemented on 
these predictors as a means of separating more qualified candidates from less qualified 
candidates. A cutoff score is the point within a distribution of scores that separates scores 
that pass from those that fail. A passing score meets or exceeds the cutoff; a failing score 
falls below it. 
A dilemma occurs when employers try to reach optimal levels of economic utility 
while also trying to achieve workforce diversity when selecting job candidates. In most 
circumstances, reaching one of these goals prohibits achieving the other goal because 
many minority groups have lower scores on some of the more popular selection tests 
(Campion et al.. 2001; Cascio et ai. 199]; Sackett & Roth, 1991; Sackett & Wilk, 1994). 
Although under some conditions civil rights laws regulate the achievement of a 
diverse workforce, organizations also seek to achieve a diverse workforce because it may 
very well contribute to the overall success. Examples of such reasons include making the 
organization more attractive to highly qualified minority candidates and customers or 
creating better solutions to problems through the benefits of heterogeneous groups 
(Sackett & Wilk, 1994). 
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Referral Methods 
Cascio et al. (1991) explored the statistical implications of six common methods 
used in setting cutoff scores. These methods, known as referral methods, describe 
specific ways in which test scores will be used to make selection decisions. Referral 
methods include the following: strict (i.e., race neutral) top down referral in order of the 
test scores; within group percentile referral; fixed bands, using random referral within 
bands; fixed bands, using nonrandom diversity based referral within bands; sliding bands, 
using random referral within bands; and sliding bands, using nonrandom, diversity based 
referral within bands. 
Strict top down referral is the traditional model for personnel selection. It involves 
selecting the candidates with the highest scores on a test or a series of selection 
procedures without regard to group membership (i.e., sex or race) or any measurement 
error that may be present in these assessments. Applicants are selected in a top down 
fashion, starting with the highest score, until all positions are filled. Top down referral 
results in the highest levels of overall performance and economic utility of the test. This 
method also results in the highest levels of adverse impact of any of the other referral 
methods. Thus, it is not the preferred method for creating a diverse workforce (Aguinis, 
Cortina, & Goldberg. 1998; Campion et al., 2001; Cascio et al., 1991; Murphy, 1994; 
Murphy & Osten, 1995; Siskin, 1995). 
In the past, within group percentile referral methods (also known as race norming 
when done by race) have been used to eliminate adverse impact. This method involves 
selecting candidates according to their percentile ranking within their group. This method 
is generally used on selection procedures that yield mean differences between gender or 
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ethnic groups and result in adverse impact (Sackett & Roth, 1991). If this method is used, 
it creates the highest selection of minority candidates and eliminates adverse impact but 
often leads to losses in overall performance and economic utility of the test. This method 
is often criticized because it ignores obtained raw scores difference between minority and 
nonminority candidates. A minority candidate could have a score of 70 and be selected 
over a nonminority candidate with a score of 85 if that candidate's percentile rank was 
higher within his or her racial or ethnic group. Furthermore, race norming is explicitly 
prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Campion et al., 2001; Murphy, 1994; Murphy 
& Osten, 1995). 
Banding 
The latter four of these referral methods are forms of banding. Banding has gained 
popularity because it serves as an alternative to top down selection and helps employers 
make decisions when faced with the dilemma of creating a diversified workforce and 
achieving high levels of economic utility from a selection test (Campion et al., 2001). 
Tests and psychological assessments are never perfect measures and are plagued by 
certain amounts of unreliability. Banding is based on the notion that small differences in 
test scores do not necessarily mean that the higher scoring individuals will out perform 
the lower scoring individual due to the inherent unreliability of the test. Thus, individuals 
with scores within a specified range of scores are treated as if the scores are identical 
(Cascio et al., 1991; Murphy & Myors, 1995; Sackett & Roth, 1991). 
Statistical data on the error of measurement within the test, the social value, 
utility, and desire to create workforce diversity influence are variables that influence 
which candidate will be selected. The various forms of banding differ in the ways that the 
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test data are incorporated, but usually do not differ in the social and economic goals 
associated with this method (Cascio et al., 1991). Most of the research on banding has 
focused on how banding strategies can be used to reduce adverse impact and minimize 
losses in utility. Evidence has been found that supports this notion (Cascio et al., 1991; 
Report of the Scientific Affairs Committee, 1994; Sackett & Roth. 1991). 
Social Value of Banding 
Banding is commonly used to reduce the levels of adverse impact that may result 
from a typical selection test. If two ethnic groups differ in their test score means, 
relatively few members from the lower scoring group will be selected on the basis of 
their scores. Banding is a way of selecting candidates that can result in a greater number 
of minority candidates being selected and lowers the probability of adverse impact 
(Murphy & Osten, 1995). Campion et al. (2001) pointed out that the use of banding has 
increased since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Banding is not a new concept, 
however. Most organizations utilize some form of banding, whether it is a pass/fail 
cutoff, a descriptive classification of candidates based on some scored criterion, or a 
letter grade assigned to a group of scores, which is done in the academic setting. 
Statistical Rationale for Banding 
The size, or width, of a band is determined by four variables: the reliability of the 
test, the standard deviation of the test, a constant of 1.41 (i.e.. the square root of two), and 
how confident one wants to be that two scores are reliably different from each other. 
Lower reliabilities lead to larger bandwidths. Increased confidence (e.g.. 99% versus 
95%) and/or larger standard deviation of test scores also lead to larger bandwidths. The 
confidence value should be one tailed (e.g., 1.65 for 95% confidence) because all scores 
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are compared against the highest score in the band. Scores outside the band are reliably 
lower than the highest score in the band (assuming sliding bands). The equation for 
bandwidth is given below. 
Bandwidth = C X SDx [sqrt(l-rxx)} X [sqrt(2)] (1) 
Where 
C is the confidence value (e.g., 1.65 for 1 -tailed) 
SDx is the standard deviation of the test 
rxx is the reliability of the test 
Once bandwidth is established, the first band is formed by subtracting the 
bandwidth from the highest score. All scores in that range are in the band. All scores 
outside the range are outside the band. For example, if bandwidth is 10 points and the 
highest score is 98, then the band includes all scores from 98 to 88. A score of 87 is 
outside the band and is considered, given the error of measurement on the test, to be 
reliably lower than 98. A score of 88, however, is considered to be the same score as 98, 
given the amount of measurement error in the test. 
Bandwidth Issues 
Statistically, bandwidth varies according to the reliability of the test, the standard 
deviation of the test, and the confidence interval (C) placed on the band. The confidence 
interval is the only area that the employer has statistical control over when creating the 
band. A higher confidence interval creates a wider band and incorporates more members 
from a lower scoring group. It is not uncommon to see a 30% increase in bandwidth 
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when moving from a 95% to 99% confidence interval, or a 50% increase in bandwidth 
when moving from a 68% to 95% confidence interval. A higher confidence interval 
creates greater assurance that candidates outside of the band reliably differ from the 
highest score within the band (Murphy, 2001). 
Campion et al. (2001) suggested that further research needs to be conducted to 
determine other factors that may be relevant when creating a band. These areas include 
the nature of the job, the legal and political environment pertaining to a diverse 
workforce, and the business necessity for a diverse workforce. For instance, they stated 
that bandwidth should be narrower for jobs that involve high risks for incorrect decisions 
(e.g., police officer) and should be wider for jobs that are low in risk. Narrower bands 
would make it less probable that lower scoring candidates to be included and lower the 
risk of selecting a candidate with a lower true score that would perform worse in the 
actual job setting. 
Fixed vs. Sliding Bands 
There are two forms of banding: fixed or sliding. Both reference the same 
bandwidth for a given standard error of measurement and confidence interval. Both types 
also reference the highest observed score to create the upper point of the band. However, 
they differ in the constancy of the candidates within the band (Murphy & Osten, 1995). 
In a fixed band, the location of the band (e.g.. scores ranging from 86 to 95) remains 
constant. An example of fixed bands exists in the college grading system. This system 
groups a specified range of scores and assigns a letter grade to scores within that range. 
Thus scores of 80-89 might be considered equal and all translate into a "B" letter grade, 
and scores of 89 and 90 might be treated as different and translate into "B" and "A" letter 
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grades (Murphy, 1994). Candidates within fixed bands are selected through random or 
nonrandom procedures until the band is exhausted of candidates. If more job openings 
remain after the top band has been depleted of candidates, candidates from a second band 
are chosen (Cascio et al., 1991). 
Sliding bands differ from fixed bands because their location changes every time 
the top scorer is chosen, regardless of whether or not other candidates remain within the 
band. If the top scorer is chosen and other candidates remain within the same band, the 
next highest remaining candidate is then used as a reference point for the formation of a 
new band. Thus, the highest scorer outside of the original band (which was previously 
considered different from the highest scores) may now be included into the top band and 
considered statistically equal to the remaining scores within that band. Sliding bands 
provide more opportunities for selection of minority candidates than do fixed bands 
because they move through the distribution more quickly (Murphy & Osten, 1995). They 
have been shown to produce minority selection rates comparable to the proportion of 
minorities within the applicant pool (Cascio et al., 1991; Sackett & Roth. 1991). 
Selection Wilhin Bands 
Once a band is formed, selection of candidates within the band can be random or 
nonrandom. Random selection allows for each candidate within the band to have an equal 
chance of being selected and is used with the rationale that all candidates within the band 
are not reliably different from each other and therefore performance differences should 
not exist. Nonrandom selection occurs when applicants are chosen on some criteria other 
than their observed score on the test in question (e.g., diversity, job experience, training, 
seniority, score on another test). Use of minority preference as a tie breaker is done to 
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reduce levels of adverse impact and create optimum economic utility for the test or 
selection procedure (Cascio et al., 1991; Cascio, Goldstein, Outtz. & Zedeek, 1995; 
Murphy & Osten, 1995). 
Sackett and Roth (1991) reported that random selection within bands creates the 
same rate of minority hiring as strict top down selection. Banding can only be expected to 
increase minority hiring when a nonrandom procedure with minority preference is used. 
Specifically, sliding bands with minority preference selection creates the highest rate of 
minority hiring of the banding approaches (Cascio et al., 1991; Sackett & Roth 1991). 
Cascio et al. (1991) reported a 47% minority hiring rate when sliding bands were used 
with minority preference, which did not result in adverse impact (i.e.. the 4/5th rule was 
not violated). In comparison, the strict top down and the fixed band with minority 
preference approaches resulted in 20% minority hiring rates, which resulted in adverse 
impact. The sliding band with random selection resulted in 14% minority hiring rate, 
which also resulted in adverse impact. Thus, sliding bands with diversity based referral 
may be the preferred strategy for employers desiring both high utility and diversity from 
their selection tests. 
Selection within the band is also affected by the characteristics of the applicant 
pool. The proportion of applicants from the lower scoring group, group differences in 
mean test scores, and group differences in the standard deviation of the test scores all 
affect the outcome that a banding strategy will produce. The proportion of applicants 
from the lower scoring group affects the total number of candidates w ho will be selected 
from that group. If there is a low proportion, fewer candidates will be selected from that 
group. The inverse is true for a high proportion of candidates. Likewise, the differences 
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in mean test scores between two groups affect the selection likelihood of a candidate 
from the lower scoring group. Larger differences between mean scores of the two groups 
result in less probability of the lower scoring group being selected. Smaller differences 
result in a higher probability of selection. The difference in the standard deviation of the 
two groups will also affect the selection outcome. If the standard deviation is large within 
either group, it will increase the number of applicants selected from the lower scoring 
group (Murphy & Osten, 1995). 
The selection ratio can also affect the proportion of candidates chosen from the 
lower scoring group when bands are used. Lower scoring candidates benefit the least if 
the selection ratio is very high or low and the reliability of the test is very high. The 
number of candidates chosen from the lower scoring group is most beneficial (i.e., 
candidates from the lower scoring group have a higher probability of selection) when the 
selection ratio is moderate and the reliability of the test is low (Murphy, 1 994; Murphy & 
Osten, 1995; Sackett & Roth, 1991). Therefore, the same banding approach may be 
applied to different situations and have different results as a function of dissimilar 
selection ratios (Report of the Academic Affairs Committee, 1994). 
Test Utility and Banding 
Test utility refers to how useful a test is to the organization. Sackett and Roth 
(1991) suggested that banding would result in overall losses in selection utility in 
comparison to top down referral. Specifically, wider bands result in the selection of lower 
test score averages. Therefore, narrower bands result in higher utility than wider bands. 
Utility of the band is also affected by how the selection occurs within the band (Murphy 
1994). According to Zedeck, Outtz, Cascio, & Goldstein (1991). it is reasonable for an 
11 
organization to suffer some loss in utility in order to improve the diversification of their 
workforce. Banding is one alternative to top down referral that allows for minimal losses 
of utility in an effort to create diversity. Zedeck et al. (1991) referenced the Cascio et al. 
(1991) data set to support their statement. Cascio et al. reported a mean score of 88.79 for 
sliding bands with minority preference in comparison to a score of 89.81 for a race blind, 
top down approach. The similarity of mean scores illustrates the minimal loss in utility 
when the banding strategy is used in comparison to the top down approach. 
Criticisms of Banding 
Kehoe and Tenopyr (1994) illustrated a flaw that is evident within banding. Given 
that candidates within the band are considered equal due to measurement within the test, 
retest data should show different scores for candidates within the band. However, their 
retest data showed that given typical levels of reliability and confidence (i.e.. 95%) 
candidates at the top of the band can be 25 times more likely to score higher than 
candidates at the bottom of the band. Using criterion data, they also showed similar data 
from which they concluded that scorers at the top of the band could be twice as likely to 
outperform scorers at the bottom of the band while on the job. However, contrary to the 
findings of Kehoe and Tenopyr. Siskin (1995) presented a mathematical model that 
illustrated that in most situations, the top scorer in the band is only slightly more likely to 
outperform the bottom scorer. 
Aguinis et al. (1998) also agreed with the postulate that performance levels differ 
within a band. They reported that applicants that fall within the same band can easily 
have different performance levels. Along the same line, Schmidt (1991) reported that the 
band must then be formed on the bases of a regression line that predicts job performance 
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from test scores. If a band is formed based on this principle, tests with a validity of .50 
will include 97% of all candidates at the 95% confidence interval. Essentially, all 
candidates would be placed in the same band, rendering banding virtually useless 
(Campion et al., 2001). 
Another criticism of banding concerns the motives that people have when using 
an unreliable test. Since greater unreliability within a test results in a wider bandwidth, 
people could purposely use less reliable tests to create a wider band. However, this 
approach leads to a less valid test and is considered unethical, which reduces the 
likelihood that it will occur (Cascio et al., 1995). Cascio et al. noted that this approach 
could occur for top down selection as well, but critics only make the point in reference to 
banding. Regardless of the validity of these criticisms, banding still offers a way for 
organizations to meet the dual goals of high utility and workforce diversity. 
Legality of Banding 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 illustrated the controversy surrounding the issue of 
minority preference in selection procedures by prohibiting any group based score 
adjustments. Thus, any banding procedure that is used for the reason of minority 
preference could be successfully challenged in court (Report of the Scientific Affairs 
Committee, 1994). The statistical rationale behind banding has been upheld in various 
court cases (Bridgeport Guardians v. City of Bridgeport, 1991; Office for Justice v. Civil 
Service Commission, 1992). Thus, the psychometric and statistical rationale for placing 
scores in a band is beyond legal dispute. It is nonrandom selection of applicants from 
within a band that rests on questionable legal footing. However, these court cases have 
not supported banding when it is used with minority preference. Banding allows for 
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choices to be made on some criteria other than test scores such as job experience, 
seniority, prior job performance, licensing, etc. It was recommended that professional 
conduct, education, and training/experience be used as the secondary criteria in the 
Officers v. CSC (1992) case (Gutman & Christiansen, 1997; Campion et al., 2001). 
However, when group membership (i.e., race and sex) is the variable used to break ties 
within the band, its legality is questionable. The most recent and relevant rulings from the 
Supreme Court (the University of Michigan cases: Gratz et al. vs. Bollinger el al., 2003; 
Grutter vs. Bollinger el al., 2003) have failed to unambiguously answer the question as to 
whether group membership can be used to select applicants within bands. Thus, the door 
to using banding to achieve the goals of high utility and workforce diversity has been left 
open. 
The Present Study 
Most utility estimates, regardless of banding issues, make one assumption: job 
offers will be accepted 100% of the time. Murphy (1986) found that utility estimates 
overestimate utility gains by 30%-S0% when this assumption is not met. To this point, no 
one has examined the utility of banding as well as the diversity increases of banding 
when the assumption of 100% job offer acceptance is not met. The present study will do 
so. 
Hypothesis la: Utility differences between top down selection and sliding bands 
with race preferential selection will be reduced when some of the top scoring applicants 
refuse or are not offered the job. 
Murphy (1986) reported that more than 35% of job offers are turned down in the 
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technical and engineering fields and more than 25% of jobs are turned down in non-
technical fields. Candidates who no longer desire a specific job can be expected to refuse 
that job offer. This refusal can occur because the candidate has already accepted or plans 
to accept an alternative job, has plans to pursue other opportunities, or because of 
personal reasons. It is unknown whether the refusal of job offers will affect the gains in 
diversity offered by sliding bands with minority preference versus strict top down 
selection. 
Hypothesis lb: Adverse impact differences between top down selection and 
sliding bands with race preferential selection will be reduced when some of the top 
scoring applicants refuse or are not offered the job. 
Intuitively, the highest scoring minorities can also be expected to turn down the 
job at a higher rate than the higher scoring majorities. This follows the logic that high 
scoring minorities are more likely to be in demand by various organizations than their 
high scoring majority counterparts and are therefore more likely to turn down job offers 
because of their available options. Thus, another hypothesis was created to illustrate what 
would happen to utility and adverse impact if minorities turned down the job at a higher 
rate than minorities. 
Hypothesis 2a: Utility differences between top down selection and sliding bands 
with race preferential selection will be reduced when high scoring minority applicants 
refuse offers at a rate higher than high scoring majority applicants. 
Hypothesis 2b: Adverse impact differences between top down selection and 
sliding bands with race preferential selection will be reduced when high scoring minority 
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applicants refuse offers at a rate higher than high scoring majority applicants. 
Method 
Data Generation 
Normally distributed test score data were generated using a program created in the 
C programming language. The simulated data were used to represent applicant test scores 
for both minority and majority groups. The majority group applicants were randomly 
generated in a population with a mean score of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. The 
minority group applicants were randomly generated in a population with a mean score of 
85 and a standard deviation of 15. Thus, minority group members1 scores were modeled 
to average one standard deviation lower than majority group members (Sackett & Roth, 
1991). Scores were then rounded to their nearest whole number. Simulated applicants 
were then selected from the total applicant pool through use of strict top down and sliding 
bands with race preferential selection strategies. 
We simulated field conditions in which each applicant pool had a fixed 
percentage of minority and majority applicants (50% for each group). We selected a 
condition of equal representation in the applicant pool because Sackett and Roth's (1991) 
study showed the best results for banding (in terms of highest adverse impact ratios) 
when the applicant pool was evenly divided. The within group standard deviation (15), 
reliability (.9), and confidence value (95%, one tailed) were then used to compute the 
bandwidth, which was calculated to be 11.07 points. The two selection methods (strict 
top down and sliding band with minority preference) were then applied to the total 
simulated applicant pool. The following variables were used to model applicant scores: 
1. Total Selection ratio (across both groups): 10% and 30%. 
3. Total sample size: 100 and 600. 
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3. Percent of job offers that would be accepted if the applicant was offered the job: 100% 
for both groups, 90% for both groups, and 90% for majority group / 80% for minority 
group. 
For those conditions in which some of the job offers would not be accepted, the 
dichotomous variable of rejecting/accepting the job offer was generated in a manner such 
that it correlated approximately .5 (correlations range from .45 to .55) with applicant test 
score; that is, higher scoring applicants (presumably with more job opportunities) were 
more likely to reject the job offer. One thousand simulations were run for each condition. 
Analyses 
For all analyses, the dependent variables were the mean test score of all selected 
applicants and the adverse impact ratios for each of the selection strategies. Each 
simulation in each condition yielded four dependent variables: mean test score with top 
down selection, mean test score with sliding bands with race preferential selection, 
adverse impact ratio with top down selection, and adverse impact ratio with sliding bands 
with race preferential selection. We computed the difference between mean test scores 
and adverse impact ratios which reduced the number of dependent variables from four to 
two for simulation for each condition. Thus, each dependent variable reflected the 
difference in either utility or adverse impact ratios that would be obtained from the two 
selection strategies. Mean differences between conditions were examined with 
independent samples t tests. 
Results 
Tables 1 and 2 list the mean (averaged across 1000 simulations) adverse impact 
ratios and mean test scores of candidates selected for the job through the use of strict top 
down and sliding band with minority preference selection strategies. Table 1 illustrates 
results when the sample size is 100 and Table 2 illustrates results when the sample size is 
600. The tables summarize data from the 10% and 30% selection ratios crossed with the 
100%o, 90%, and 90% (majority) / 80% (minority) job acceptance rates. 
The results show a number of findings, some expected, others unexpected. Results 
were nearly identical for both the 100 and 600 sample size conditions; however, there 
were a few more deviant results when the sample size was 100. As expected, strict top 
down selection produced higher mean test scores. Utility (as indexed by mean score of 
applicants hired) is lower for higher selection ratios. Within each condition, adverse 
impact ratios were better and utilities were worse for banding based selection versus top 
down selection. Both utility and adverse impact ratios are lower when high scoring 
applicants decline the job offer. Finally, when minorities turn down the job at a rate 
greater than majorities and banding is used to make selection decisions, utility increases 
and adverse impact ratios decrease. 
A couple of unexpected results were also observed. First, in a number of 
instances, banding based selection resulted in lower adverse impact ratios at higher 
selection ratios. This finding is contrary to existing research (Sackett & Wilk, 1994), 
which shows higher (i.e., better) adverse impact ratios for higher selection ratios. Second, 
adverse impact ratios under top down selection actually improved when high scoring 




Mean Test Scores of Selected Applicants (Utility) and 
Adverse Impact when N = 100 
Total Mean Score Mean Score Adverse Adverse 
Selection (Utility) (Utility) Impact Impact 
Ratio TOD Down Banding Top Down Banding 
100% Job Acceptance Rates 
10 120.8 119.1 16.1 81.8 
30 111.3 110.1 29.1 79.2 
90% Job Acceptance Rates 
10 114.3 112.6 15.6 79.3 
30 105.0 103.6 25.8 75.8 
90% Majority and 80% Minority Job Acceptance Rates 
10 114.8 113.3 20.2 79.1 
30 105.1 103.9 24.2 66.4 
Note. All entries are mean scores across 1000 simulations. When jobs w ere accepted 
90%, majority and minority group members turned down the job at a .49 correlation with 
their score. When jobs were accepted by 90% of majority group member and 80% of 
minority group members, majority group members turned down the job at a .48 
correlation and minority group members turned down the job at a 50 correlation with 
their test score. 
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Table 2 
Mean Test Scores of Selected Applicants (Utility) and 
Adverse Impact when N = 600 
Total Mean Score Mean Score Adverse Adverse 
Selection (Utility) (Utility) Impact Impact 
Ratio Top Down Banding Top Down Band i nti 
100% Job Acceptance Rates 
10 121.3 119.7 14.6 68.4 
30 111.5 110.3 28.7 76.8 
90% Job Acceptance Rates 
10 115.3 113.7 15.0 68.3 
30 105.5 104.3 26.1 73.4 
90% Majority and 80%> Minority Job Acceptance Rates 
10 115.5 114.0 16.8 64.1 
30 105.6 104.3 22.6 61.0 
Note. All entries are mean scores across 1000 simulations. When jobs were accepted 
90%, majority and minority group members turned down the job at a .46 correlation with 
their score. When jobs were accepted by 90%) of majority group member and 80%) of 
minority group members, majority group members turned down the job at a .46 
correlation and minority group members turned down the job at a .51 correlation with 
their test score. 
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Decreasing the representation of minority candidates relative to majority candidates 
should lower adverse impact (i.e., make it worse). Given that these results reflect the 
average across 1000 simulations, sampling error is an unlikely cause. 
With regard to our hypotheses, the results were mixed. Hypothesis la stated that 
the utility difference between selection strategies (top down versus sliding band with 
minority preference) would narrow when some high scoring applicants (10% of minority 
and 10% of majority) refused the job offer. To test this (and all subsequent hypotheses), 
we conduced independent sample t tests between the 100% acceptance simulations and 
the simulations in which some of the applicants refused the job offer. For each 
hypothesis, four comparisons were made: 100% job acceptance compared with less than 
100% job acceptance at each corresponding selection ratio (10% or 30%) for both sample 
sizes (100 or 600). Unfortunately, Hypothesis la was only supported in one of the four 
comparisons (n = 600, 10% selection ratio), 1998) = 2.74,p < .05. Given only one 
significant result out of four and given that in one of the other three comparisons, the 
mean difference was large enough to be significant in the -wrong direction (i.e., the utility 
difference actually increased), we conclude that Hypothesis la was not supported. 
Results were similarly mixed for Hypothesis lb, which stated that adverse impact 
difference between the two strategies would narrow when higher scoring applicants from 
both groups refused the job offer. Independent samples t tests revealed significant mean 
differences in only one of the four comparisons (n = 600, 30% selection ratio), ^(1998) = 
2.56,/? < .05. Thus, we conclude Hypothesis lb was not supported. In short, differences 
in utility and adverse impact between the alternative selection strategies (top down versus 
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banding) do not change when higher scoring applicants from both groups refuse the job 
offer in equal proportions. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b, similar to Hypotheses la and lb, stated that utility and 
adverse impact differences between the selection strategies would narrow when high 
scoring minority group members refused the job at higher rates than majority group 
members. Similar to the results found for Hypothesis la, the results for Hypothesis 2a 
were mixed, with significant differences for two of the four comparisons (n = 100, 10% 
selection ratio and n = 600, 10% selection ratio), ^(1998) = 5.68. p < .05 and /(1998) = 
14.74,/? < .05. respectively. Thus, we conclude that Hypothesis 2a was not supported. 
Hypothesis 2b, however, was supported with significant results in all four comparisons, 
/'(l998) = 2.84, p < .05 for the least significant comparison. Thus, we conclude that 
although utility differences between the selection strategies remain constant the 
differences in adverse impact between the two selection strategies diminish (banding 
becomes profoundly less effective at hiring minorities) when minorities refuse the job 
offer more often than majority group members. 
Discussion 
Previous studies (e.g., Cascio, 1991; Sackett and Roth. 1991) have established the 
costs (lower test utility) and benefits (reduced adverse impact problems) associated with 
the use of sliding bands with minority preference as compared to strict top down 
selection. Unfortunately, all job offers are not accepted by applicants, reducing the utility 
of testing (Murphy. 1986). The effects of rejected job offers on banding based selection 
as compared with top down selection strategies have not been examined to date. Our 
study attempted to identify and model the true costs and benefits of banding (utility and 
adverse impact) in a simulation that resembles the reality of selection (i.e., with rejected 
job offers). We found that on an absolute level, both utility and adverse impact ratios 
were lowered for both top down and sliding band selection when applicants refused the 
job offer, but the differences between the selection strategies in terms of utility and 
adverse impact ratios were unchanged as long as members of both groups refused the job 
in the same proportion. When minority group applicants refused the job offer at a rate 
greater than the majority group (20% versus 10% job offer rejection rates, respectively), 
utility differences between the two selection strategies were again unchanged, but the 
difference in adverse impact ratios (again, between the available selection strategies) 
were reduced. Thus, the benefit of using banding as opposed to top down selection, in 
terms of more favorable adverse impact ratios, was smaller in magnitude w hen minority 
group members refused job offers at a rate greater than the majority group. 
The only limitations with our study concerned the realism of the assumptions used 
in our model. Specifically, if minority group members refuse job offers at a rate equal to 
or less than majority group members, then Hypothesis 2b (minority group members 
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refuse the job at a higher rate than majorities), although supported in our analyses, would 
be irrelevant. Alternatively, if minority group members refuse job offers at a rate greater 
than majority group members, then the benefits of banding in terms of more desirable 
adverse impact ratios over top down selection would be further reduced. 
Future research regarding the costs and benefits of banding should explore two 
avenues. First, the previously mentioned job offer rejection rates should be modeled to 
include even more skewed ratios (e.g., 0% rejection for majority group versus 20% for 
minority group). Second, the relative size of the majority and minority groups in the 
applicant pool should also be modeled to ratios other than the 50/50 split used in this 
study. We employed an equal representation condition because Sackett and Roth's (1991) 
analysis demonstrated it to have the best results (i.e., biggest benefit) in terms of adverse 
impact. Other, more skewed ratios might accelerate the decline in benefits in terms of 
adverse impact for banding based selection strategies. 
The use of sliding bands with minority preference for selection offers clear 
benefits to the employer at little cost to test utility (Sackett & Roth, 1991). The research 
presented here indicates that the benefits might not be as great as previously thought. 
Furthermore, the legality of using a minority preference rule to break the ties within 
bands is questionable given the most recent Supreme Court rulings. Future research or 
future litigation might invalidate any benefit associated with banding and render (or 
expose) the selection strategy to be functionally impotent. 
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